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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
In this paper, we construct a parsimonious overlapping-generations model of human capital accumulation 
and study its quantitative implications for the evolution of the U.S. wage distribution from 1970 to 2000. 
A key feature of the model is that individuals differ in their ability to accumulate human capital, which is 
the main source of wage inequality in this model. We examine the response of this model to skill-biased 
technical change (SBTC), which is modeled as an increase in the trend growth rate of the price of human 
capital starting in the early 1970s. The model displays behavior that is consistent with several important 
trends observed in the US data, including the rise in overall wage inequality; the fall and subsequent rise 
in the college premium, as well as the fact that this behavior was most pronounced for younger workers; 
the rise in within-group inequality; the stagnation in median wage growth; and the small rise in consump-
tion inequality despite the large rise in wage inequality. We consider different scenarios regarding how 
individuals’ expectations evolve during SBTC. Specifically, we study the case where individuals imme-
diately realize the advent of SBTC (perfect foresight), and the case where they initially underestimate the 
future growth of the price of human capital (pessimistic priors), but learn the truth in a Bayesian fashion 
over time. Lack of perfect foresight appears to have little effect on the main results of the paper. Overall, 
the model shows promise for explaining a diverse set of wage distribution trends observed since the 
1970s in a unifying human capital framework. 
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 1 Introduction
The U.S. economy, and the labor market in particular, has experienced substantial changes
since the early 1970s. Among the most notable of the trends observed during this period was
a rise in overall wage inequality that started slowly in the 1970s, but accelerated substantially
in the 1980s. Perhaps surprisingly, however, wage inequality between education groups (i.e.,
the college premium) followed a diﬀerent pattern: it fell precipitously during the 1970s, but
then also rose substantially in most of the subsequent two decades. Despite these big changes
in cross-sectional measures of wage dispersion, the rise in consumption inequality (which is
a proxy for the inequality in lifetime wage incomes) was very much muted. Finally, in
addition to these trends in inequality, macroeconomists have documented a sharp slowdown
in aggregate labor productivity growth, and labor economists have found a parallel stagnation
in median wage growth, which both started around 1973 and lasted until the mid-1990s.1
While these trends have typically been documented by economists in diﬀerent ﬁelds,
studying diﬀerent questions, they in fact all point to changes in the moments of the U.S.
wage distribution during this time. Motivated by decades of research emphasizing the cen-
tral role of human capital accumulation for the determination of wages, it seems natural to
wonder whether the human capital theory can shed light on these developments. Therefore,
the goal of this paper is to investigate how much mileage one can get toward explaining these
phenomena using a parsimonious overlapping-generations model of human capital accumu-
lation.
The model we construct has the following features. Individuals are born with a ﬁxed
endowment of “raw labor” (health, strength, etc.), but are able to accumulate “human capital”
(skills, knowledge, etc.) over the life cycle. Raw labor and human capital earn separate
wages in the labor market, and each individual supplies both of these factors of production
at competitively determined wages. In a given period, an individual is either employed
full-time or is enrolled in school (accumulating human capital full-time). However, while
employed, an individual can choose to allocate any fraction of his time—subject to an upper
bound—to human capital accumulation. We assume that skills are general and the labor
market is competitive. As a result, the cost of this on-the-job investment will be completely
borne by workers, and ﬁrms will adjust the hourly wage rate downward by the fraction of
time workers spend learning new skills (Becker (1964)). Thus, the cost of human capital
investment is given by these forgone earnings.
An important diﬀerence of the framework outlined above from the standard human cap-
ital model (e.g., Ben-Porath (1967)) is the introduction of raw labor as a second factor of
production. This “two-factor” structure serves a key role in the results of this paper. This
is because the standard Ben-Porath model lacks a well-deﬁned notion of “returns-to-skill,”
which is essential for studying skill-biased technical change as we do in this paper. As we
elaborate in Section 2.4, while the Ben-Porath model has a “price of human capital,” in a
1For extensive documentation of these trends, see Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992),
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Card and Lemieux (2001), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a,b), Krueger
and Perri (2006), and the excellent surveys by Katz and Autor (1999) and Acemoglu (2002).
2stationary world, a higher price level (or wage) aﬀects the cost and beneﬁt of investment
in exactly the same way, leaving the trade-oﬀ, and therefore the investment decision, un-
aﬀected.2 In contrast, in the present model, the marginal cost of investment (i.e., forgone
earnings) is proportional to the prices of both human capital and raw labor, whereas the
marginal beneﬁt of investment is proportional only to the former. Therefore, a high price of
human capital increases the beneﬁt more than the cost, resulting in higher investment.
A second key feature we introduce into this framework is heterogeneity in the ability to
accumulate human capital. As a result, individuals diﬀer systematically in the amount of
investment they undertake, and consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the life
cycle. Although the idea that individuals may diﬀer in their ability is not new, here we are
motivated by recent microeconometric evidence which ﬁnds that such heterogeneity is sub-
stantial (Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007, 2009), and Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006a,b)).
For the parameters chosen, the model generates a large rise in within-cohort wage inequality
over the life cycle, quantitatively consistent with the values reported in these studies.
The production side of the economy is modeled as an aggregate constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) technology that takes raw labor and human capital as inputs. The third
key feature in the model, and the driving force behind the non-stationary changes during
this period, is skill-biased technical change (SBTC)—modeled here as a rise in the price
of human capital relative to raw labor—that occurs starting in the early 1970s.3 In the
baseline model, we assume that individuals do not anticipate SBTC before it happens, but
have perfect foresight about the future once it starts. (We relax this assumption later.)
It is important to point out that the speciﬁcation of the production function here departs
from the existing literature, which typically assumes a CES production function that takes
the labor supplied by workers with high and low education as its two inputs (cf., Katz and
Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). Furthermore, because SBTC is typically
modeled in these studies as an increase in the relative demand for educated workers, it
creates variation in wages between education groups, but does not have a diﬀerential impact
on individuals within each group. Instead, in the present framework all individuals supply
both factors of production, and therefore, simultaneously lose from the fall in the price of raw
labor and gain from the increase in the price of human capital. Moreover, since individuals
diﬀer in both age and ability level, these gains and losses are distributed diﬀerently across
the population (including within each education group), which creates rich dynamics in the
evolution of the wage distribution. This feature allows us to study both between-group and
within-group wage inequality in a single framework.
The model is calibrated to match some key moments of the wage distribution before
SBTC takes eﬀect in 1970. We then systematically examine the implications of the model
for the evolutions after 1970 of (i) the second moments (measures of inequality), (ii) the ﬁrst
2To increase investment incentives in the Ben-Porath model, one would need to assume an acceleration in
the growth rate of the price of human capital. But in a model with a single factor of production, this would
also mean an acceleration in total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates during the period since 1970s,
which is clearly counterfactual.
3For empirical evidence on SBTC, see, for example, Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998), Machin and Van Reenen (1998), and the survey by Acemoglu (2002).
3moments (measures of average wages), and (iii) lifetime wage distribution (proportional to
consumption in the model).
First, in the model overall wage inequality (measured by the cross-sectional variance of
log wages) rises slowly in the 1970s, but substantially faster in the 1980s, as in the data.
The slow rise early on is closely linked to the decline in between-group inequality (college
premium) during the same time, which brings the wages of diﬀerent education groups closer
to each other, thereby compressing the overall distribution. However, counteracting this
force is a rise in within-group wage inequality, which prevents overall inequality from falling
in the 1970s. Therefore, the model is consistent with the behavior of both between-group
and overall wage inequality during the 1970s.
The mechanism behind the non-monotonic behavior of the college premium can be ex-
plained as follows. Essentially, because human capital investment is a forward-looking de-
cision, individuals increase their investment immediately after SBTC begins. Moreover, be-
cause college graduates have higher learning ability (by self-selection) than those with lower
education, their investment increases more strongly, which increases their forgone earnings
and therefore reduces their relative wages in the short run. Over time, this higher investment
begins to pay oﬀ, and the college premium starts to grow rapidly after the initial decline. As
can be expected from this discussion, this mechanism is stronger for younger individuals who
face a longer horizon and, thus, expect higher beneﬁts from SBTC. Therefore, the college
premium falls and rises substantially for young workers (but much less for the old), consistent
with this behavior in the U.S. data (cf., Murphy and Welch (1992), and Card and Lemieux
(2001)). Finally, the model is also consistent with the behavior of the relative wages of each
education-experience group during this period (in particular, with the steepening (ﬂatten-
ing) of cross-sectional proﬁles for high school (college) graduates in the 1980s) documented
by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and Johnson (1992).
We then turn to the behavior of labor productivity growth (and median wage growth)
in the model, which both fall sharply in the early 1970s in response to SBTC and then
recover very slowly. The slowdown is quantitatively large, with the median wage growth
rate between 1970 and 1995 averaging about half its value before 1970. Labor productivity
slowdown is sharper in the short run, but the recovery is also faster, averaging 80 percent of
its value prior to SBTC in the period from 1970 to 1995.
Several authors have documented that consumption inequality in the United States has
not increased nearly as much as wage inequality, especially at the upper tail (cf., Autor,
Katz, and Kearney (2004), and Krueger and Perri (2006)). Turning to the model, inequality
in (the present discounted value of) lifetime income barely rises after 1970. The intuition for
this result can be understood by noting that wage inequality in the model increases due to
the fanning out of lifecycle wage proﬁles (see ﬁgure 12). As a result, those individuals whose
wages rise the most later in life are exactly those whose wages remain lower early in life
due to increased human capital investment, which then keeps the change in lifetime incomes
small. This mechanism is consistent with the observation that individuals in many high-skill
occupations (doctors, engineers, professors, etc.), whose incomes have risen tremendously in
the last decades, have had to go through longer periods of education, training, internship,
4certiﬁcation, and so on to be able to attain those high income levels.
The amount of average on-the-job investment implied by the model is 2.9 hours a week
(assuming a 40-hour workweek) in 1970 and rises to 5.1 hours a week in 1995. While ideally,
one would also want to compare this and other implications for human capital accumulation
with the data, this approach is not straightforward. This is because, as is well understood
since Becker (1964), Ben-Porath (1967), and others, on-the-job investment in human capital
theory is a much broader concept than the relatively limited notion of training directly
provided by ﬁrms, which makes the total amount of such investment notoriously diﬃcult to
measure, let alone quantifying how much it has changed over time for diﬀerent groups in the
population. For example, Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) piece together information from
six diﬀerent data sources and estimate that total investment on the job is at least seven times
larger than the formal training provided by ﬁrms. The alternative approach of focusing on
educational attainment does not seem to be very fruitful either. This is because, although
formal education and on-the-job investment are likely to be positively related on average, this
is not always the case, especially in response to major technological changes such as SBTC.
For example, we provide an extension of the present framework in Guvenen and Kuruscu
(2007, section 4), which retains many of the plausible implications for the wage distribution,
but implies that college enrollment falls—whereas on-the-job investment rises—in the short
run after SBTC. That extension, however, makes the model substantially more complicated
and is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we keep the focus of this paper on
the evolution of the wage distribution and do not venture into providing a model to study
the details of educational attainment. See section 4.4 for further discussion of these points.
As noted above, in the baseline model we assume that individuals have perfect foresight
after SBTC begins. While this assumption is common in the literature, there are good reasons
to question the robustness of the results to such a stark assumption. Therefore, in sections 3
and 4, we also study the implications of the model when individuals have imperfect foresight
and form initial beliefs about the future growth rate of factor prices (SBTC), which they then
update over time in a Bayesian fashion. We consider the case where these initial beliefs are
unbiased as well as when they are very pessimistic (such that the average individual in 1970
forecasts no SBTC in the future, and half of the population in fact expects the price of human
capital to continually fall in the future). Although some new and interesting channels become
operational with imperfect foresight, for plausible parameter values these eﬀects turn out to
be too small and do not alter the conclusions drawn in this paper. Furthermore, in section
4.1.3 we also show that in certain cases, imperfect foresight can strengthen the mechanisms
outlined for the deterministic model above.
In a companion paper, Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007), we theoretically study a slightly
simpliﬁed version of the baseline model in this paper. Whereas in that paper we establish
several results about the behavior of the wage distribution during SBTC theoretically, the
main contribution of the present paper is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the
model’s ability to explain the observed trends quantitatively.
A precursor to our paper is Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998). To our knowledge,
their paper was the ﬁrst to emphasize that with human capital accumulation, skill prices
5and observed wages diﬀer, and that this could be important for understanding the recent rise
in wage inequality. This observation also plays an important role in our model. However,
the present paper also diﬀers from theirs in several important respects. Two of these have
already been mentioned above: One, the present paper extends the Ben-Porath model to
allow for returns-to-skill; and two, a central thesis here is that individuals diﬀer signiﬁcantly
in their ability to accumulate human capital, which is not the case in that paper. As a result,
for example, the college premium falls signiﬁcantly in our model even when the production
function is linear, whereas imperfect substitution in the production function and changes in
cohort sizes over time are essential for this result in that paper. In addition, in the long
run after SBTC all measures of inequality increase in the present paper, whereas many of
them—overall wage inequality, college-premium, within-group inequality—fall in that paper.
Finally, we also examine the robustness of our results to the lack of perfect foresight. We
discuss a number of other diﬀerences between the two models later in the paper.
This paper is also related to the macroeconomics literature that studies the slowdown
in labor productivity. Important examples include Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Green-
wood and Yorukoglu (1997), Caselli (1999), and Violante (2002). Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1999) emphasize the role of skill in facilitating the adoption of new technologies. They
argue that the advent of computer technologies in the 1970s presented such a change, which
increased the wages of skilled workers and resulted in a productivity slowdown due to the
time it takes to utilize the new technologies eﬀectively. Hornstein and Krusell (1996) also
make a similar observation, but add that the acceleration in quality improvements during
this period has exacerbated measurement problems, further reducing measured productivity
growth. Caselli (1999) studies a model where diﬀerences in innate ability and newer tech-
nologies that are more costly to learn than existing ones result in a rising skill premium.
Violante (2002) develops a model of within-group inequality, in which vintage-speciﬁc skills,
embodied technological acceleration, and labor market frictions combine to generate rising
inequality. These papers share the feature that technical change is embodied in new ma-
chines; in the present paper, however, it is disembodied. It is possible to argue that both
types of technological changes have been taking place during this period, so the mechanisms
emphasized in these papers are complementary to ours.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model, and section 3
discusses the calibration. Section 4 contains the results of the baseline model with perfect
foresight as well as the versions with imperfect foresight. Section 5 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
The economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals who live for S years. There is
no population growth and we normalize the population size to 1, implying that the measure
of s-year old individuals, (s); is equal to 1=S.
62.1 A Two-Factor Model of Human Capital Accumulation
Individuals begin life with an endowment of “raw labor” (i.e., strength, health, etc.) which is
constant over the life cycle, and are able to accumulate “human capital” (skills, knowledge,
etc.) over the life cycle, which is the only skill that can be accumulated in this economy.
There is a continuum of individuals in every cohort, indexed by j 2 [0;1], who diﬀer in
their ability to accumulate human capital, denoted by Aj (also referred to as their “type”).
Although, in some cases below, we will allow individuals to also diﬀer in their raw labor
endowment as well as in their beliefs, the heterogeneity in ability will be the crucial source
of heterogeneity in the model.
Each individual has one unit of time endowment in each period that can be allocated
between producing output and accumulating human capital. Let l denote raw labor and h
j
s;t
denote the human capital in period t of an s-year-old individual of type j. We assume that
raw labor and human capital earn separate wages in the labor market, and each individual
supplies both of these factors of production at competitively determined wage rates, denoted
by PL;t and PH;t, respectively.4



















s;t is the fraction of time devoted to human capital investment, henceforth referred to
as “investment time”; and Q
j
s;t is the newly produced human capital, which will be referred to
simply as “investment” in the rest of the paper. According to this formulation, new human
capital is produced by combining the existing stocks of raw labor and human capital with
the available investment time.5
A key parameter in this speciﬁcation is Aj, which determines the productivity of learn-
ing. Due to the heterogeneity in Aj, individuals will diﬀer systematically in the amount of
investment they undertake, and consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the life
cycle. Another important parameter is  2 [0;1]; which determines the degree of diminish-
ing marginal returns in the human capital production function. A low value of  implies
higher diminishing returns, in which case it is optimal to spread investment over time. In
contrast, when  is high the marginal return on investment does not fall quickly, and invest-
ment becomes bunched over time. In the extreme case when  = 1, individuals either spend
all their time on investment (i
j
s;t = 1) or none at all in a given period.
4The structure we have in mind is not one where an individual works at manual tasks (using raw labor
only) some fraction of the time and at cognitive (or skill-intensive) tasks at other times. Instead, the worker
employs both factors of production simultaneously in producing output. For example, a college professor
uses both his/her body and knowledge/skills at the same time when teaching, although probably at diﬀerent
proportions than a farmer, an auto mechanic, or a brain surgeon.
5The dependence of the weights in the human capital production function on t is to stress that these
could be time-varying.
7Investment in human capital takes place on the job as long as it does not exceed a fraction
 of an individual’s time endowment in a period. If the individual wants to invest more, he
enrolls in college and invests 100 percent of his time. Thus, the choice set for investment
time is i
j
s;t 2 [0;] [ f1g; which is non-convex when  < 1. An upper bound less than 100
percent on on-the-job investment seems plausible as it could arise, for example, if the ﬁrm
incurs ﬁxed costs for employing each worker (administrative burden, cost of oﬃce space,
etc.), or due to minimum wage laws.6
We assume that skills are general (i.e., not ﬁrm-speciﬁc) and labor markets are compet-
itive. As a result, the cost of human capital investment is completely borne by workers,
and ﬁrms adjust the hourly wage rate downward by the fraction of time invested on the job





































is the “potential earnings” of an individual—that is, the income an
individual would earn if he spent all his time producing for his employer. Therefore, wage
income can be written as the potential earnings minus the “cost of investment,” which is
simply the forgone earnings while individuals are learning new skills. Since labor supply is
inelastic, w
j
s;t is also just a scaled version of the individual’s observed “wage rate.”
2.2 A CES Aggregate Production Function
































where the integrals are thus taken over the distribution of individuals of all types and ages.
The superscripts in Hnet
t and Lnet
t stress that these variables measure the actual amounts of
each factor used in production, that is, net of the time allocated to human capital investment.
The aggregate ﬁrm uses these two inputs to produce a single good, denoted by Y; according









6In addition to its plausibility, such an upper bound is also important for a meaningful quantitative
analysis. Otherwise, with a continuum of ability levels, there will be some individuals who invest slightly
less than 100 percent of their time, appearing as employed while earning a wage income very close to zero.
Because many of the statistics we analyze below involve the logarithm of wage rates as well as the variances
of these logarithms, even a small number of such individuals can easily wreak havoc with the quantitative
exercise.
8where   1; and Z is the total factor productivity (TFP). For simplicity we assume that
capital is not used in production. Notice that human capital and raw labor enter the ag-
gregate production function and human capital function with the same weights (compare
equations (1) and (4)).7
The ﬁrm solves a static problem by hiring factors from households every period to maxi-
mize its proﬁt: Y   PLLnet   PHHnet: Using the optimality conditions for this problem, the












While the aggregate production function has the same CES form commonly used in
the literature, its inputs are diﬀerent from what is typically assumed. In most previous
work, Hnet and Lnet denote the number of workers with college and high school education,
respectively. Therefore, a change in the price of Hnet relative to Lnet has the same eﬀect on
all individuals within an education group. As a result, the college premium is simply equal
to PH=PL and satisﬁes the relationship in (5). A key implication of this equation is that
a rise in the relative supply of high-skill workers will reduce the college premium. Several
authors have emphasized this link to argue that the fall in the college premium during the
1970s resulted from the rapid increase in the supply of college-educated workers (cf., Katz
and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and Heckman et al. (1998)). In
contrast, in the present model, all workers have some endowment of human capital (which
varies by ability and age) and l (which is the same for all), and every worker contributes to
both factors of production. Therefore, a change in the price of Hnet relative to Lnet aﬀects all
individuals diﬀerently depending on their ability level as well as their age. As a result, the
present model allows us to study both within-group and between-group wage inequality in a
unifying framework. Moreover, as we show below, the college premium is now very diﬀerent
from PH=PL.
An important special case arises when  = 1: In this case, human capital and raw labor
become perfectly substitutable, and the relative wage in equation (5) reduces to PH=PL =
H=L: Therefore, this assumption eliminates the link between the relative supply of high-
skill labor and the college premium mentioned above. To highlight the role of the mechanism
proposed in this paper for the college premium, we make this assumption from this point
on. Furthermore, in the appendix we provide evidence indicating that this is an empirically
plausible choice for the curvature for this type of production function.8
7We have experimented with two other speciﬁcations of the human capital accumulation function that
also seemed a priori plausible. In particular, we write the human capital function as Aj((L;tl +H;thj
s)ij
s)
and consider (i) weights that remain constant through SBTC: L;t = L and H;t = H; and (ii) no role for
raw labor in human capital production: L;t = 0 and H;t = 1: The ﬁrst case had implications qualitatively
similar to the baseline model described here, while the second displayed some implausible behavior even in
steady state (that is, without SBTC). Overall, the simplest speciﬁcation used here (originally proposed and
studied in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007)) also turned out to have the most plausible quantitative implications.
8In the NBER working paper version of this article (No. 13095, Appendix B), we also analyze the more
92.3 SBTC and Bayesian Learning about Skill Prices
Skill-neutral technological progress takes place at a constant rate: Zt+1 = (1 + g)Zt. The
focus of this paper is on skill-biased changes in technology, which we model as follows. The
productivity of each factor follows a random walk with drift in levels:9
H;t+1 =  + H;t + "t+1; and (6)
L;t+1 =   + L;t   "t+1;
where "  N (0;2
"): There are several points to note in this speciﬁcation. First, the inno-
vations to the productivity of each factor sum to zero, so these random shocks only aﬀect
the productivity of each factor relative to the other. Second, the secular growth rates of
the productivity of each factor also sum to zero. Therefore,  captures the trend growth in
skill-biased technical change (SBTC) when it is positive. Putting the two together shows
that  and "t+1 only aﬀect the relative productivity of factors: H;t+1 + L;t+1 = H;t + L;t.
The growth rate of each factor’s productivity is zero (i.e.,   0) up to time 0. Skill-
biased technical change is modeled as an unanticipated regime change in the growth rate of
human capital’s productivity relative to raw labor. Speciﬁcally,  =  > 0; for t = 1;:::;T;
and  reverts back to zero again for t > T: Therefore, SBTC is assumed to last for a ﬁnite
period of time, which will be motivated below by empirical evidence.
Modeling Expectations of Future. A diﬃcult question that researchers face when
studying periods of transition concerns the modeling of individuals’ expectations of the
future: what do individuals know and when do they know about it? For example, did
individuals realize the advent of skill-biased technical change (or, call it the IT revolution,
the information age, etc.) soon after it started in the 1970s? Or were they completely
unaware that many companies were rapidly investing in new IT technologies10 and that the
demand for cognitive skills was rising during that time? Perhaps, as seems plausible, some
workers were initially more aware than others—because of diﬀerences in education level,
social networks, occupations, and so on—but over time, all workers have learned about the
new regime. But, if so, how fast was this learning process?
To circumvent these issues, the bulk of the previous literature assumes either perfect
foresight or myopic expectations about the future. While both of these extreme cases have
the appeal of providing simple benchmarks, the questions raised above cannot be easily
general case with  < 1 and show that it does not alter any of the substantive conclusions reached in the
present paper.
9An important advantage of the random walk speciﬁcation in the levels of H;t and L;t (instead of their
logarithms) is that it makes the model tractable and allows a closed-form solution for the optimal investment
choice in the presence of uncertainty and Bayesian learning about future skill prices. Although a potential
drawback of this structure is that the productivity of a factor may become negative, for our choices of
parameter values, the probability of this outcome will be negligible.
10See, for example, Greenwood (1997) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) for detailed descriptive evi-
dence on the rapid pace of technology upgrading by ﬁrms during this period.
10dismissed. Therefore, in the quantitative analysis we will consider a number of alternative
scenarios regarding individuals’ beliefs about the future after SBTC. In particular, we allow
individuals to diﬀer in their initial beliefs about the evolution of future skill prices—and as
an extreme case, we also allow individuals to systematically underestimate the growth of
future skill prices (i.e., have pessimistic prior beliefs)—but learn the truth over time in a
Bayesian fashion. We now describe these cases in turn.
In the ﬁrst benchmark, we assume that (i) skill prices evolve in a deterministic fashion
(i.e., "  0), and (ii) as soon as SBTC begins, individuals learn  and T and, therefore,
have perfect foresight about the future paths of H;t and L;t. We refer to this case as the
deterministic benchmark.
In the second benchmark, we allow for imperfect foresight. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
before time 0, individuals’ forecasts of  had converged to the true value (  0) after
observing a suﬃciently long history of skill prices. Let n denote an index that uniquely
identiﬁes each individual in the history of this economy (which can be constructed by taking
the interaction of ability type j and year of birth t0). At the time of the shock, each
individual (who is in the labor market at that time) receives an initial (private) signal about
the future growth rate: n
0 = +n
0; where n
0  N (m;2
"=v) and where n is an index that
uniquely identiﬁes each individual in the economy deﬁned above. Therefore, individual n’s
initial forecast is n
0 with a precision of v=2
":11 The population average of initial forecasts
is  + m. Therefore, prior beliefs are unbiased when m = 0 and are “pessimistic” when
m < 0: In subsequent periods, individuals observe their own wage realization and update
their forecast of . Since the source of uncertainty is aggregate, all individuals observe the
same path of prices, and their beliefs eventually converge to each other—and hence to the
truth. (The details of the Bayesian learning problem and exact formulas are provided in
Appendix 6.)
2.4 Individuals’ Lifetime Income Maximization Problem
We ﬁrst describe individuals’ maximization problem in the deterministic baseline case and
then explain how this changes with stochastic skill prices and Bayesian learning.
Deterministic Benchmark. Individuals are able to borrow and lend at a constant
interest rate, r, which is suﬃcient for markets to be complete in this deterministic model.
Under complete markets, the consumption-savings decision can be disentangled from the
lifetime income maximization problem. Therefore, to study the determination of wages,








denote the present discounted value of lifetime income of individual j
who is s years old at time t. The income maximization problem of the agent can be written
11Similarly, the prior beliefs for individuals who enter the economy at t0 > 0 are drawn from a distribution




















































where the evolution of factor prices is given by equation (6) and "  0. We should stress
again that our focus on the lifetime income maximization problem does not require the
assumption of risk neutrality; any concave utility function implies the same human capital
investment behavior in this environment.
Optimal Investment Decision. It is instructive to discuss the qualitative features of
investment behavior in this model, which will play important roles in the quantitative results
below.
Using equation (1), the opportunity cost of investing an amount Q
j
















When there is an interior solution for investment time (speciﬁcally, assuming  = 1 and
i
j












where   (1 + g)=(1 + r) (see Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007) for derivation). The left-hand
side of this equation is the marginal cost, and the right-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt
(MB) of investing in human capital. The latter is the present discounted value of the
future stream of wages that is earned by an additional unit of human capital. An important
implication of (10) is that an increase in future skill prices will immediately aﬀect current
investment behavior because of the forward-looking nature of this equation.
Remark. A key observation is that optimal investment, Q
j
s;t; only depends on the level
of H—not on the levels of L or Z: This is because the opportunity cost of investment
depends on the prices of both raw labor and human capital (see equation (9)), whereas the
marginal beneﬁt is only proportional to the price of human capital. As a result, a higher level
of H (for example, due to SBTC) increases the marginal beneﬁt more than the marginal
cost, resulting in higher investment. This feature is an important diﬀerence between the
12current framework and the standard Ben-Porath model. In the latter, a higher price of
human capital (which is the only factor of production, since there is no raw labor) aﬀects the
cost and beneﬁt of investment exactly the same way, leaving the trade-oﬀ—and therefore
the investment decision—unaﬀected. It is precisely for this reason that it is diﬃcult to
think of the concept of returns-to-skill in that framework, because a higher price of human
capital has no eﬀect on the decision to invest. Instead, in the present model, H=L is
a measure of returns-to-skill and aﬀects investment in human capital without necessarily
implying anything about aggregate productivity (which is captured by Z and also has no
eﬀect on investment incentives for the same reason discussed for the Ben-Porath model).12










This expression highlights the main sources of heterogeneity in this model: (i) individ-
uals with higher learning ability invest more in human capital: @Q
j
s;t=@Aj > 0; (ii) more
importantly, their investment responds more strongly to SBTC: @2Q
j
s;t=@H;t+k@Aj > 0 (for
all k > 0); (iii) investment goes down over the life cycle: @Q
j
s;t=@s < 0; and ﬁnally, younger
individuals respond more strongly to SBTC: @2Q
j
s;t=@H;t+k@s < 0:
Price, Investment, and Quantity Eﬀects. Armed with this characterization of optimal
investment behavior, we are now ready to discuss how the wage of a typical worker changes















The eﬀects of SBTC on wages work through three separate channels, which can be seen
from this expression. First, individuals will increase their investment immediately in response
to SBTC, resulting in a rise in the cost of investment, which will then reduce the wage rate.
We call this the “investment eﬀect.” The discussion above makes clear that this eﬀect is
strongest (most negative) for those with high ability and/or those who are young.





s;t ﬁxed), the wage rate will change due to the fact that L;t is falling
and H;t is rising over time. We call this the “price eﬀect.” The price eﬀect will be positive
(negative) for individuals who have a high (low) stock of human capital relative to their raw
labor (that is, those with high (low) ability and/or labor market experience). Moreover, the
price eﬀect strengthens over time as H;t=L;t rises during SBTC.
Third, and ﬁnally, the increased investment gradually raises the stock of human capital,
h
j
s;t; which in turn gradually raises the wage rate. We call this the “quantity eﬀect.” No-
tice that the quantity eﬀect is stronger for younger (and/or high-ability) individuals whose
12Although an increase in the growth rate of Z will increase investment rates, there is no evidence of
increased TFP growth rate after the 1970s; in fact, there is ample evidence to the contrary.
13investment responds more strongly to SBTC than it is for older (and/or low-ability) indi-
viduals. These three eﬀects are crucial for understanding the changes in the wage structure
after SBTC, and we will refer to them throughout the paper.
Individuals’ Problem with Bayesian Learning. With stochastic skill prices and





































S+1  0; and equations (6), (8), and (15). The conditional expectation at time t
is taken with respect to the information set containing (b n
t ;H;t). Notice that choice and state
variables are indexed by individual type n (and not simply by ability type j). This is because,
even conditional on ability, individuals who observe diﬀerent initial signals about the path of
skill prices will have diﬀerent investment and human capital levels. The optimality condition














which only diﬀers from (10) in the appearance here of the expectations operator, which is
individual-speciﬁc reﬂecting the diﬀerent prior beliefs held by diﬀerent individuals. Sub-






0 = b1;sH;t + b2;sb 
n
t ; (13)
where b1;s and b2;s are some age-dependent positive constants.13 The key point to observe
here is that optimal investment only depends on the indiviual’s forecast, b n
t ; but not on its
variance, 2
;t: In other words, the uncertainty that an individual faces about future prices
of human capital plays no role in the optimal investment decision. However, investment
behavior in this model will still be diﬀerent from that in the deterministic benchmark because
(i) diﬀerent individuals have diﬀerent forecasts b n
t , and (ii) even if b n
t   for all individuals
in all periods, now H;t is stochastic in equation (13), which will aﬀect the average investment
rate in the economy. We return to this point in the quantitative analysis.
2.5 Heterogeneity in Investment and Wages over the Life Cycle
Using the closed-form expressions derived above, we now construct the life cycle proﬁles
of human capital investment and the implied wage paths in steady state (ﬁgure 1). The
two panels in this ﬁgure are generated using the same parameter values as in the calibrated
economy of the next section (except that we set  = 1 here) to highlight the aspects of the life
cycle investment behavior that will play a quantitatively important role in our results. The
13b1;s = (1 (1+r)
 S+s)
r and b2;s =
PS s 1
m=1 (1 + r)
 m m

14Figure 1: Cross-Sectional Diﬀerences in Investment Time and Wages over the Life Cycle





















































































Each line corresponds 
to a different A
j
ﬁrst point to note is the substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in investment rates observed
early in life (left panel), which ranges from virtually no investment for very low-ability
individuals all the way to full-time investment for those with highest ability (who enroll in
college). This signiﬁcant cross-sectional heterogeneity is at the heart of the mechanism that
generates many of the results in this paper, including the decline in the college premium in
the 1970s and the small rise in consumption inequality, among others.
In the right panel, the wage proﬁles show signiﬁcant fanning out over the life cycle,
which is the only source of wage inequality in this model. The implication that systematic
diﬀerences in growth rates are the major driving force behind the rise in wage inequality over
the life cycle is supported by recent empirical studies that estimate wage and labor earnings
processes from micro data sets (Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007, 2009), Huggett, Ventura
and Yaron (2006a,b)).14 For example, the calibrated version of the present model in the
next section implies that the cross-sectional wage inequality at age 55 is about 9 times the
inequality at age 35. For comparison, Guvenen (2009, table 2) reports that the component
of wage inequality that is due to systematic diﬀerences in growth rates (that is, net of the
inequality due to idiosyncratic shocks) is about 10.5 times the inequality at age 35.
14This approach is diﬀerent, for example, from the strategy followed by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1998) who also allow for ability diﬀerences (in the standard Ben-Porath model) but proxy learning ability
with the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) score, which results in very small diﬀerences in cross-
sectional investment and wage proﬁles. Compare, for example, ﬁgure 1 here to ﬁgure 3 in that paper.
153 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the three diﬀerent versions of the general framework described
in the previous section to the U.S. data under the assumption that the U.S. economy was
in steady state before SBTC took eﬀect in 1970. The model is solved numerically, and the
results below are computed using simulated data. For the stochastic versions (Models 2 and
3 below), we simulate 300 paths for aggregate skill prices and 600 individuals in each cohort.
We then compare the evolution of the wage distribution implied by the model from 1970 to
2000 to the data. The U.S. wage data used in this paper are from the annual March Current
Population Surveys (CPS) on full-time full-year male workers covering the period 1963 to
2003, and have been provided to us by David Autor; they are the same as the data used in
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a,b).15
Model 1: Deterministic Baseline (DB)
The ﬁrst model is obtained by assuming (i) 2
" = 0; so that there are no shocks to skill
prices, and n
0  0 for all individuals, so that individuals have perfect foresight about the
future.
Model 2: Bayesian Learning with Unbiased Priors (BL0)
The second model is obtained by assuming (i) 2
" > 0; so that there are shocks to
skill prices, and individuals learn about the future evolution of skill prices after SBTC in
a Bayesian fashion as described above. We consider two versions of this model. We ﬁrst
consider the case when the initial signal is unbiased: E (n
0) = 0 (which is the case described
above). We refer to this version with unbiased priors as the BL0 model.
Model 3: Bayesian Learning with Pessimistic Priors (BL )
It is also useful to consider a third case where the initial signal is pessimistic, so that the
average forecast of the growth of skill prices is well below the truth. In particular, we assume
E (n
0) =   so that the average initial forecast is b 0 =   = 0: In this case, individuals
on average do not realize the advent of SBTC, and in fact half of them forecast that skill
prices will fall. Moreover, in the calibration below, we will choose the parameters such that
almost all individuals will initially underestimate the true growth rate of skill prices, and
learning will be slow during SBTC. We refer to this pessimistic version as the BL  model.
3.1 Calibration
Except where noted below, the calibration of parameters is common to all three models.
Individuals enter the economy at age 20 and retire at 65 (S = 45). The net interest rate, r,
is set equal to 0.05, and the subjective time discount rate is set to  = 1=(1 + r).
15Our focus on male workers is to abstract from the signiﬁcant changes during this period in females’ labor
market participation rates, fertility rates, family composition, and so on, which may potentially have aﬀected
the determination of females’ wages (more so than males’ wages). Having said that, it should be noted that
many of the trends documented below have also been observed in females’ wages, suggesting that the human
capital channels emphasized in this paper could also have played an important role in the evolution of wages
for that group as well.
16Aggregate Production Function. The growth rate of neutral technology level, Z, is
set equal to 1.5 percent per year. As will become clear below, measured TFP growth will be
diﬀerent from this number when the amount of investment on the job changes over time. As
mentioned above, the curvature of the aggregate production technology, ; is set equal to 1.0.
Notice that L and H always appear multiplicatively with raw labor and human capital, so
the initial values of these parameters serve only as a normalization (given that H and L are
also calibrated below). Therefore, we normalize L;t + H;t = 1 and set L;t = H;t = 0:5 for
all t < 1970: We calibrate the change in the skill bias of technology after 1970 below.
Human Capital Accumulation. The estimates of —the curvature of the human capital
accumulation function—typically vary between 0.80 and 0.95 (see, for example, Heckman
(1976), and the more recent estimates in Heckman et al. (1998) and Kuruscu (2006)).
In Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007) we show, theoretically, that if  is higher than a certain
threshold the college premium will fall and average wages will stagnate in the short run after
SBTC (consistent with the data). Therefore, here we set  = 0:80, a value close to the lower
end of this empirically plausible range, to show that the plausible quantitative implications
found in the next section do not require an extremely high value of .16
Accounting for Idiosyncratic Shocks. For a meaningful comparison of the model to
the data, it is important to account for the fact that the model abstracts from idiosyncratic
shocks, which are present in the data. To this end, we assume that the logarithm of the












s;t denotes the systematic (or life cycle) component of wages and is given by the
baseline human capital model in this paper; 
j
s;t represents a ﬁrst-order autoregressive shock
process, and 
j
s;t is a transitory disturbance with variance 2
. Both the innovation to the
AR(1) process and 
j
s;t are i.i.d. conditional on all individual characteristics (including s and
Aj). This speciﬁcation is similar to the econometric processes for wages commonly used in
the literature.17 The key assumption we make is that the variances of these idiosyncratic
shocks have been stationary during the period under study.18 Under this assumption, and
16We have also experimented with values between 0.60 and 0.95, and found that they had a qualitatively
small eﬀect on our results. These results are available from the authors upon request.
17Notice that here we are adding these shocks to the wages obtained from a deterministic human capital
model, rather than solving for the human capital choice in the presence of these shocks. In Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009), we tackled this issue directly and solved for investment and wages in the
presence of multiplicative shocks. While that extension came at considerable computational cost, the basic
behavior of the model was not substantively diﬀerent along the dimensions explored in this paper. Therefore,
here we opt for the simpler deterministic speciﬁcation.
18While several studies have found the variances of idiosyncratic shocks to have increased during this
period (Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1994), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), among others), these studies do not
account for the possibility that the dispersion of wage growth rates could have increased during this time,



















 denotes the cross-sectional variance of the AR(1) process across all age and ability
groups. Two points are easily noted from this expression. First, the level of the variance






before it can be compared to the











); which allows a direct comparison of the
trend in the model variances to its empirical counterpart.
Similarly, the implications of the speciﬁcation in (14) for the ﬁrst moment of wages can













; where I denotes a set of individuals—for example,
those in the same age or education group. Therefore, both the level of, and the change in,
the ﬁrst moments of log wages in the model can be directly compared to the data.
Aggregate Shocks and Prior Beliefs after SBTC. In the stochastic versions of the
model (BL0 and BL ), the innovation standard deviation of the aggregate shocks to skill
bias, "; is calibrated so that the model is consistent with the variability of the college
premium observed in the data. In our data set, the standard deviation of the annual change
in the college premium,  (!
t); is 1:7 percent per year during the period 1963 to 2003.
However, when " is small, the stochastic versions of the model behave very much like
their deterministic counterpart (DB), which is already examined separately. Therefore, we
choose a higher target for the volatility of the college premium,  (!
t) = 2:5 percent, and
set " = 0:0025 to match this target. The implied annual volatility of the relative skill
prices,  (log(H=L)), is 1:4 percent. Below, we will also examine some implications of
the model when skill prices are even more volatile to further illustrate the role of uncertainty
and learning on the behavior of the model.
The dispersion of prior beliefs (or initial forecasts of ) is given 2
"=v: A larger value of
v reduces the initial heterogeneity in beliefs, as well as slowing down the speed of learning
(equation (15)). The goal of the BL versions of the model is to examine how individuals
respond to SBTC when they have signiﬁcant initial uncertainty about SBTC and this un-
certainty is not resolved very quickly (otherwise we are back to the DB model). We choose
v = 2:5; which implies that in the BL  model, 99.4 percent of individuals initially underes-
timate the true growth rate of skill prices. This choice also implies a slow rate of learning:
10 years after the start of SBTC, 86.7 percent of individuals still underestimate the true rate
of growth of skill prices.
The same information can be seen more clearly in ﬁgure 2. The left panel (unbiased
priors) plots the true growth rate  over time as well as the mean forecast (marked with
which is the main thesis of the present paper. Therefore, that evidence is not informative about how the
variances should be calibrated over time in our model. Haider (2001, table 4) does allow for dispersion of
growth rates to change over time and reports a very small increase in the variance of shocks during this time.
18Figure 2: Distribution of Forecasts of Skill Prices (b n
t ) Over Time
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circles) and the two-standard deviation bounds for the distribution of forecasts (dash-dot
lines). The mean forecast overlaps with the true value of  as expected and the dispersion
in beliefs goes down over time, although very slowly. The right panel shows the pessimistic
priors case. The mean forecast (marked with squares) starts well below the true value
in 1971 and rises gradually; it is still below the truth in 1995, although not substantially.
Moreover, the two-standard deviation bounds show that even the most optimistic individuals
are underestimating SBTC in this case during the 1970s.
Maximum on-the-job Investment We set  equal to 0.50, which implies (together
with the other parameters below) that in the initial steady state before SBTC, the lowest
wage is 51 percent of the average (mean) wage in the economy. For comparison, in 1970
the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage in the US data was 0.49 according to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).19
Distributions of Ability and Raw Labor. Learning ability, Aj; is assumed to be uni-
formly distributed in the population with the same parameters for every cohort. As for the
calibration of individuals’ raw labor endowment, note that the present model is interpreted
as applying to human capital accumulation after secondary school. But then, the assumption
we made in the theoretical model—that individuals start out with the same human capital
level—may be too restrictive because it seems likely that diﬀerent individuals would have ac-
cumulated diﬀerent amounts of human capital by the time they make the college enrollment
decision. A simple way to model this heterogeneity is by assuming that the amount of raw
labor, l; has a non-degenerate distribution in the population. We also assume l to have a
19The US data statistic is obtained from the OECD’s website (www.stats.oecd.org).
19uniform distribution that is the same for all cohorts. Each distribution is fully characterized
by two parameters, giving us four parameters to be calibrated.20 The mean value of raw
labor, E [lj]; is a scaling parameter and is normalized to one, leaving three parameters: (i)
the cross-sectional standard deviation of raw labor,  (lj); (ii) the mean learning ability,
E [Aj], and (iii) the dispersion in the ability to learn,  (Aj): These are chosen to match the
following three moments:
1. the average cross-sectional variance of log wages between 1965 and 1969,
2. the average level of the log college premium between 1965 and 1969,
3. the mean log wage growth over the life cycle.
As discussed above, we need an estimate of the variances 2
 and 2
 to obtain the target
value for the cross-sectional wage inequality. Note that, for consistency, these estimates
must be obtained from empirical studies that allow for heterogeneity in wage growth rates
as implied by the human capital model in this paper.21 Guvenen (2009) estimates such a
speciﬁcation and reports 2
 to be 0.047. Similarly, 2
 can be calculated to be 0.088 using
the estimates in that paper (table 1, row 2). The average cross-sectional variance of log
wages in the U.S. data between 1965 and 1969 is 0.239, implying a target value for the ﬁrst






) of 0.104. Second, the log college premium in the U.S. data
averaged 0.381 between 1965 and 1969 (and does not require any adjustments), which is the
second empirical target we choose. Third, and ﬁnally, our target for mean log wage growth
between ages 20 and 55 is 50 percent for a cohort of individuals who retire before 1970. This
number is roughly the middle point of the ﬁgures found in studies that estimate life cycle
wage and income proﬁles from panel data sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(which typically report estimates between 40 and 65 percent; see, for example, Gourinchas
and Parker (2002), Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2002), and Guvenen (2007)).
Table 1 displays the implied values for the distributions of Aj and lj: Notice that the
coeﬃcient of variation of ability is more than four times that of raw labor. Overall, het-
erogeneity in l has a much more modest eﬀect on the quantitative results than does the
heterogeneity in ability. Finally, it should be stressed that with this calibration the model
also matches the cross-sectional variance of wage growth rates observed in the U.S. data (see
the discussion above, in section 2.5).
20Notice that we also need to calibrate the cross-sectional correlation of l and A. Since we interpret the
heterogeneity in l as arising from investments made prior to college, and high-ability individuals are likely
to have invested more even before college, it seems reasonable to conjecture that A and l will be positively
correlated. Indeed, Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006b) estimate the parameters of the standard Ben-
Porath model from individual wage data allowing for heterogeneity in A and l, and provide evidence that the
two are strongly positively correlated (corr: 0.792). For simplicity, we assume perfect correlation between
the two. Furthermore, as will become clear below, the heterogeneity in l implied by our calibration turns
out to be quite small, so the choice of perfect correlation is not likely to be critical.
21Several well-known papers on income dynamics, such as MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), and
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), restrict wage growth rates to be the same across the population and therefore
are not appropriate for calibrating the present model.
20Table 1: Baseline Parametrization
Parameters (common to all versions) Value
r Interest rate 0:05
 Time discount rate 1=(1 + r)
 Curvature of human capital function 0:80
S Years spent in the labor market 45
 Curvature of aggregate prod function 1:0
 Maximum investment on the job 0:50
logZ Growth rate of neutral technology 0:015
T Duration of SBTC (years) 26
E [lj] Average labor endowment (scaling) 1:0
Parameters: model-speciﬁc DB BL0;BL 
" Standard deviation of SBTC shocks 0 :0025
v Measure of dispersion of initial beliefs – 2:5
Parameters calibrated to match 1965-69 targets:
E [Aj] Average ability :071 0:69
 (lj)=E [lj] Coeﬀ. of variation of labor endowment :0503 :0503
 [Aj]=E [Aj] Coeﬀ. of variation of ability :245 :242
Parameter calibrated to match 1995 wage inequality:
log(H=L) % Annual change in skill-bias (1970-1995) 2:21 2:13; 2:24
Skill-Biased Technical Change. The driving force behind the non-stationary changes in
the model is a sustained increase in the relative productivity of human capital relative to raw
labor, H=L: Speciﬁcally, H grows and L shrinks by  from 1970 until 1995. The ending
year is chosen to be consistent with the observation that the rise in wage inequality seems
to have slowed down, and productivity growth has started to pick up, by the mid-1990s.
This choice is also consistent with empirical evidence indicating a slowdown in the rate of
skill-biased technical change in the second half of the 1990s (see, for example, Acemoglu
(2002)). However, this choice does not appear to be critical: assuming that SBTC continues
until 2010 had very similar implications for the behavior of the model during the 1970s and
1980s.
The main quantitative experiment is the following. After calibrating each version of the
model as above, we choose  such that each model matches the overall wage inequality in
the U.S. data in 1995 (again, adjusted for the absence of idiosyncratic shocks in the model).
The resulting values of  are 0.0054, 0.0052, and 0.0055 in the DB, BL0, and BL  models,
respectively. The implied average growth rate of H=L is 2.21, 2.13, and 2.24 percent per
year (for a total increase ranging from 70 to 78 percent during the entire period).22 Table 1
summarizes the baseline parameter choices.
22Notice that, despite the fact that L is falling during SBTC, the absolute productivity of raw labor,
ZL, continues to grow (by 0.23 percent per year) due to the sustained growth in Z. Therefore, with this
calibration, SBTC results only in a relative fall in the productivity of raw labor relative to human capital.
21Figure 3: The Evolution of Overall Wage Inequality: Model versus U.S. Data, 1965–2000.
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4 Model Results
4.1 Evolution of Wage Inequality
In this section, we examine the implications of the three diﬀerent versions of our model. As
will become clear, the three models have similar implications for several trends and only diﬀer
in their implications for certain facts. Therefore, for brevity, in cases where the implications
are very similar, we only discuss the intuition for the results in the context of the DB model,
which is the simplest.
4.1.1 Overall Wage Inequality
We begin with the evolution of overall wage inequality during this period (ﬁgure 3). The
baseline model is calibrated to match the total change in wage inequality between the ﬁrst
steady state and 1995, and not the evolution between these end points. Yet, the model seems
to nicely capture the broad pattern during this period, with a slow increase in the 1970s that
accelerates over time.
To understand this convex pattern, two separate eﬀects, which sometimes work in op-
posite directions, should be noted. First, H=L increases at a roughly linear rate (as can
be seen in the left panel of ﬁgure 5 below). If there was no change in investment rates in
response to SBTC (and therefore, the distribution of human capital remained unchanged
over this period), the price eﬀect would increase wage inequality at the same constant rate
22Figure 4: The Evolution of College Premium: Model versus U.S. Data, 1965–2000.
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as the relative price change. However, the investment rate does respond to SBTC, which
is a key feature of this model. This eﬀect works to oﬀset the price eﬀect early on, because
individuals whose investment responds more strongly to SBTC are exactly those with higher
ability, and thus who have relatively more human capital already. As a result, the rise in
wage inequality is depressed early on. Over time, however, the diﬀerential investment re-
sponse leads to an even larger dispersion in human capital levels, which reinforces the price
eﬀect and leads to an accelerating rise in wage inequality. Overall, even though SBTC begins
in 1970, most of the rise in overall wage inequality (11.5 out of the 13 log points) happens
after 1980, consistent with the U.S. data.
One notable divergence occurs during the 1980s when inequality rises faster in the data
compared to the model. Some authors have emphasized the role played by the erosion of
the legal minimum wage due to high inﬂation in the late 1970s, which resulted in the fall
of wages in the lower tail of the distribution, thereby increasing inequality (cf., Card and
Dinardo (2002)). This factor is not present in the model, which might explain the divergence
from the data during the 1980s.
4.1.2 Between-Group Inequality (College Premium)
Figure 4 plots the college premium in the simulated economies along with the empirical
counterpart. The DB model is calibrated to match the average level of premium between
231965 and 1969.23 In the model (thick solid line), the college premium falls throughout the
1970s followed by a robust increase in the next two decades, showing an overall pattern that
is both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the data.
The Mechanism for the Falling College Premium. Recall that the production func-
tion is linear in this model, so the relative supply channel emphasized by Katz and Murphy
(1992) is not operational. So how does the model generate the persistent fall in the college
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where the subscripts c and n denote college and high school graduates, respectively. Nc
and Nn denote the number of college and non-college workers (excluding current students).
Hnet
c and Lnet
c denote the human capital and raw labor supplied to the market by college
graduates. These are calculated as in equation (3) but with the integrals taken over the set
of college graduate workers. Other aggregates are deﬁned analogously. So, for example, wc is




c is approximately equal to the average hours devoted to the labor
market (that is, average hours not spent on training) by college graduates.24 Divide and

















= logG1 + logG2:
The right panel of ﬁgure 5 plots the evolution of the logarithms of G1t and G2t. The term
G1t depends on variables that adjust slowly (such as human capital stocks), and it grows
monotonically over time. In contrast, there is a steep decline in G2t; especially immediately
after SBTC. The reason is that, in response to SBTC, workers with a college degree increase
their investment time more than non-college workers (due to the diﬀerence in ability between
the two groups). Because a rise in investment time reduces Lnet but has no eﬀect on N
(conditional on working), G2t declines signiﬁcantly in the short run after SBTC. Thus, the
log education premium (line with circles in the right panel of ﬁgure of 5) initially goes down
together with G2t; and over time it bounces back when the decline in G2t tapers oﬀ and the
23A college graduate is deﬁned as an individual who has completed more than two years of full-time
investment (i = 1). This is analogous to the deﬁnition adopted by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a) (i.e.,
those who enroll in college for more than two years) when constructing the empirical counterpart.
24It can be seen by inspecting equation (3) that if there was no heterogeneity in raw labor, Lnet
c =Nnet
c
would be exactly equal to the average hours devoted to the labor market. Because the heterogeneity in raw
labor is small, this still holds approximately.
24Figure 5: Decomposing the College Premium
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growth in G1t begins to dominate. Therefore, the diﬀerential investment response captured
by G2t is crucial for the decline of college premium in the short run.
4.1.3 College Premium with Imperfect Foresight
Despite the fact that any given individual’s uncertainty about skill prices does not aﬀect
his investment behavior (equation (13)), the fact that each individual holds diﬀerent mean
beliefs does aﬀect average investment, and therefore the behavior of the college premium. To
see this, let us compare the investment decisions of two otherwise identical individuals (i.e.,
same age and ability level) who only diﬀer in their forecasts, given by  +  and    ,
respectively. From equation (11), optimal investment is a convex function of marginal beneﬁt
(as long as  > 0:5), which implies that the average of these two individuals’ investment
will be higher than if they both forecast  correctly.25 Furthermore, it can also be shown
that such a mean-preserving spread will increase investment more for younger individuals
(because b2=b1 is larger for these individuals, so the same mean-preserving spread in forecasts
of  will create a larger dispersion in the marginal beneﬁt of young individuals), and that it
will increase investment more among high-ability individuals. Putting these pieces together,
it follows that even without SBTC, higher belief heterogeneity alone can result in higher
investment among high-ability individuals, leading to a fall in the college premium. As
individuals learn over time and beliefs converge to each other, this eﬀect will weaken and
the college premium will rise again. We now turn to the quantitative results to see whether
25More precisely, let Q
j












25this is an important channel for the behavior of (and especially, for the initial decline in) the
college premium after SBTC.
First, in the BL0 model (dash-dot line in ﬁgure 4), the college premium displays a pattern
that is qualitatively very similar to the baseline model, but the decline in the premium
during the 1970s is somewhat larger (11 log points) compared to the baseline (8 log points).
Notice, however, that the baseline model diﬀers from BL0 in two dimensions: in addition to
imperfect foresight and Bayesian learning, the latter model also features skill prices that are
stochastic, which is not the case in the DB model. In order to disentangle the eﬀects of the
two features, we set v = 10000, which eﬀectively eliminates all the heterogeneity in beliefs
and Bayesian learning from the BL0 model. We ﬁnd that the college premium in this case
is almost identical to that in the BL0 model (not shown in the graph), which shows that
the heterogeneity in beliefs in the parametrization of the BL0 model is too small to have a
quantitatively signiﬁcant eﬀect. Thus, the only quantitatively signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that
skill prices are stochastic in the BL0 model, unlike in the deterministic baseline model.
Second, we turn to the BL  model. Despite the fact that priors are pessimistic and
individuals learn slowly, the college premium still falls by 8 log points during the 1970s
(dashed line in ﬁgure 4). It then rises to reach 54 log points in 1995 (compared to 57 log
points in the data). The decline in the college premium even in this case shows that the
diﬀerential investment channel highlighted in the baseline model is strong enough even when
the beneﬁts of investment are underestimated on average. One eﬀect of the pessimistic
priors is that the college premium reaches its peak level in 1972 (compared to 1971 in the
data) and its bottom in 1982 (instead of 1979 in the data). Given that the choice of 1970
as the beginning year of SBTC is somewhat arbitrary, it is not clear how important these
discrepancies are.
It is useful to discuss when, and how, imperfect foresight could aﬀect the college premium
in this model. To examine this, we further increase the heterogeneity in initial forecasts (set
"=
p
v to 50 percent of ), and further slow down the speed of learning (v = 3:5). These
choices imply  (!
t) = 3:4 percent per year—double the value in the data. Hence, this
case arguably serves as an upper bound on the eﬀect of the lack of perfect foresight. Figure
6 plots the college premium with this new calibration. As can be seen here, the decline in
the college premium is more signiﬁcant now compared to the baseline calibration: it falls by
15.5 log points in the case with unbiased priors (dash-dot line) compared to 11 log points
before, and by 10.8 log points in the case with pessimistic priors (dashed line) compared to
8 log points before. The behavior is not aﬀected qualitatively, however.
Finally, to isolate the eﬀect of belief heterogeneity, we set   0 in the last exercise
so that there is no SBTC after 1970. Thus, the only thing that happens in 1970 is a
pure “belief shock.” Now, the college premium falls by about 5 log points during the 1970s
(line with diamonds), after which point it slowly recovers as individuals gradually learn the
truth. This result could be anticipated from our previous discussion about the eﬀect of belief
heterogeneity on the evolution of the college premium. The conclusion we draw from this
exercise is that if the increase in belief heterogeneity is suﬃciently large, this alone will result
in a decline in the college premium in the short run. However, for parameter values that we
26Figure 6: The College Premium with High Uncertainty about Future Skill Prices
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consider plausible, this channel does not seem strong enough to be quantitatively important.
To summarize, these results show that the decline in the college premium in the short run
after SBTC does not critically depend on the assumption of perfect foresight. If individuals
exhibit moderate heterogeneity in their beliefs immediately after SBTC begins, this has little
eﬀect on the college premium. Even when a substantial majority of the population under-
estimates the true growth rate of the price of human capital for a prolonged period of time,
the college premium falls considerably in the short run. Furthermore, if the heterogeneity in
beliefs is larger, the decline in the college premium only gets larger.
4.1.4 College Premium within Experience Groups
We now move one step further and examine the college premium within diﬀerent experience
groups. Several authors have documented that the fall and rise in the college premium in the
U.S. data was largely due to this behavior among young workers, whereas the changes in the
college premium among the old was very much muted (Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy
and Welch (1992)). Similarly, Card and Lemieux (2001) have found the same pattern to
emerge in British and Canadian data.
In ﬁgure 7 we plot the college premium for young workers (1–15 years of experience)
and old workers (30–39 years) both in the U.S. data and in the model. For young workers
(left panel), the model understates the level of college premium before SBTC by about 20
log points. However, the evolution of the premium in the model is quite similar to that in
the data, with an initial fall of 10 log points in the 1970s, followed by a rise of about 30
27Figure 7: The College Premium by Experience Level: Model versus U.S. Data
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log points in the subsequent two decades. One diﬀerence is that the recovery in the college
premium starts in 1977 in the model compared to 1980 in the data. Overall, the evolution
of the college premium for young workers in the model is broadly consistent with the data.
Similarly, the right panel plots the college premium among older workers (30-39 years
of experience). First, observe that, as noted above, the change in the college premium
among these workers is smaller compared to young individuals: the premium does not fall
monotonically in the 1970s—the decline averages about 5 log points over the entire decade—
and the rise is also smaller—11 log points from 1980 to 1995. In the model (solid line),
there is no fall in the college premium in the 1970s; instead it goes up by 5 log points. The
premium continues to rise, albeit at a slower pace than among young workers, and increases
by 17 log points from 1980 to 1995. Therefore, the model is qualitatively consistent with
the fact that the behavior of the college premium during this time is inﬂuenced by the large
fall and rise in the premium among younger workers and the behavior among the old is less
pronounced.
The intuition for these results can be anticipated from the earlier discussions: the large
initial fall among young workers is largely due to the fact that these individuals—who face a
longer planning horizon, and hence have a larger marginal beneﬁt from investing—respond
to SBTC much more strongly than older individuals. In contrast, the slow but monotonic
rise in the college premium among older workers is mainly driven by the price eﬀect without
a signiﬁcant investment response. Therefore, the model studied in this paper oﬀers a new,
and in our view fairly plausible, explanation for the diﬀerences in the behavior of the college
premium among diﬀerent experience groups.
28Table 2: Real Wage Changes by Education and Experience Groups, 1971–1987
Change in Log Average Real Wage
Group (multiplied by 100)
Education Experience Sample 1971-79 1979-87
12 Low Data 0:8  19:8
12 Low Model  1:9  9:7
12 High Data 3:2  2:8
12 High Model  1:2  3:7
16+ Low Data  11:3 10:8
16+ Low Model  7:8 13:3
16+ High Data  4:0 1:8
16+ High Model 3:8 2:6
Notes: The empirical statistics reported are taken from Katz and Murphy (1992, table 1). The low (high)
experience group is deﬁned as workers with 1 to 5 years of experience (26–35 years of experience) in Katz and
Murphy (1992) and those with 1 to 15 years of experience (30–45 years of experience) in our model.
4.1.5 Cross-Sectional Wage Proﬁles by Education and Experience
In documenting the evolution of the relative wages of diﬀerent groups, labor economists have
gone one step further. Since the college premium is essentially the ratio of the wages of two
groups, further insights can be gained by separately examining the behavior of its numerator
and denominator. For example, the aforementioned decline in the college premium among
young workers in the 1970s is due to a fall in the numerator (college graduates’ wages),
whereas the substantial rise in the 1980s is mainly due to a fall in the denominator (high
school graduates’ wages). Two models that are consistent with the behavior of the ratio
can diﬀer greatly in their implications for the evolution of the wages of each education-
experience group (i.e., the numerator and denominator), which makes this information useful
for distinguishing between alternative explanations.
In table 2, we report the changes over time in the wages of diﬀerent education-experience
groups in the U.S. data (reproduced from Katz and Murphy (1992, table 1)). The most
striking fact that emerges from this table happens between 1979 and 1987 (last column).
First, among high school graduates, the average wage of workers with few years of experience
plummets by 19.8 percent, while older workers only see a small decline of 2.8 percent. As a
result, the cross-sectional wage proﬁle of high school graduates signiﬁcantly steepens during
this period. Remarkably, the opposite happens among college graduates: young workers see
a wage growth of 10.8 percent, whereas older ones only experience a small increase of 1.8
percent. Consequently, the cross-sectional wage proﬁle ﬂattens for this group.
We construct the model counterparts of the same statistics with one diﬀerence. As we
discuss in Section 4.2, the model does not fully capture the magnitude of the slowdown
29in average wage growth. Given that our focus here is on the relative wage changes across
education-experience groups, we normalize the data with the mean wage in a given year
before calculating the statistics. This allows us to isolate the relative changes without being
distracted by the overstated wage growth for all individuals. The model seems to capture the
changes for each education-experience group rather well, not only during the 1980s but also
going back to the 1970s. For example, during the 1970s, both in the data and in the model,
there is little diﬀerence in wage growth by experience levels among high school graduates,
whereas for college graduates there is a larger fall for younger individuals than for older
ones. More importantly, the model is consistent with the signs and rough magnitudes of
wage changes for three of the four education-experience groups from 1979 to 1987 noted
above (see the last column of table 2). For the fourth group—young high school graduates—
the model implies a signiﬁcant decline in their relative wages consistent with the data, but
it does not capture the full magnitude (9.7 percent in the model versus 19.8 percent in the
data). Overall, the average cross-sectional wage proﬁle steepens for individuals with low
education and ﬂattens for those with a college degree during this period, consistent with the
data.
Three eﬀects drive the wage changes of high school graduates of diﬀerent ages in the
1980s. First, young high school graduates also respond to SBTC (even if it is not to the
same extent as college graduates) by increasing their on-the-job investment, which reduces
their measured wages. Second, there is selection: in response to SBTC, the ability threshold
for college enrollment falls, so the average ability pool of high school graduates—those who
choose not to enroll in college—also falls, further reducing their wages. Neither one of these
channels reduces the wages of older high school graduates: since they have a much shorter
horizon, they do not increase their on-the-job investment by much, nor do they decide to
go back to college to create any compositional change. There is also a third eﬀect: young
workers have very little human capital, so the main factor they supply is raw labor. Therefore,
they suﬀer from the lower returns to raw labor, but do not beneﬁt from the higher returns to
human capital. In contrast, older high school graduates do have some human capital, so they
are able to beneﬁt from SBTC, which partly oﬀsets their loss on their raw labor endowment.
Put diﬀerently, the price eﬀect is negative for the young but close to zero for the old high
school graduates. A combination of these three factors, which work in opposite directions
for the young and old, explains why the former group experienced a large wage loss while
the latter saw no signiﬁcant change during the 1980s. Notice also that even though SBTC
begins in 1970, the three mentioned eﬀects strengthen gradually (as H=L rises) over time,
and only begin to make a noticeable impact on the wages of the young much later (1980s).26
The mechanism for the behavior of the wages of college graduates is similar, but the fact
that  < 1 also plays a role. This is because high-ability individuals who want to increase
26One popular explanation oﬀered in the literature for the steepening of the cross-sectional wage proﬁle of
high school graduates is that the quality of high school education fell signiﬁcantly during the 1970s, leading
to a fall in the wages of new high school graduates, whereas older workers were already well vested and their
wages were protected through union agreements, preventing their wages from falling. The present model
generates the same result in a perfectly competitive model, and through a completely diﬀerent mechanism
that is also consistent with other aspects of the evolution of the wage distribution.
30their investment signiﬁcantly in response to SBTC have to stay in college longer due to the
upper limit on investment while working. As a result, college students accumulate signiﬁcant
amounts of human capital before entering the labor market. Since SBTC raises the value of
human capital, the wages of young college graduates do not fall, unlike those of high school
graduates (which can be seen in the right panel of ﬁgure 12 below).
4.1.6 Within-Group Inequality
The analysis so far has focused on the evolution of some key moments of the wage distribu-
tion. However, a distribution typically contains much more information than what can be
summarized by a few moments, and it is possible for a model to be consistent with some
summary statistics, but generate patterns inconsistent with the data at a more disaggre-
gated level. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) have documented an empirical regularity at
a very disaggregated level which presents such a challenge. In ﬁgure 8 we report the same
ﬁnding using our data set which covers a longer time span (solid line). The graph plots how
each percentile of the wage distribution in 1963 (horizontal axis) has changed between 1963
and 2003 (vertical axis). The ﬁrst point to note is that wage growth over this period has
been systematically diﬀerent for every percentile of the distribution. This shows that there
is more to the rise in overall inequality than can be explained by diﬀerences in education
alone.27 Second, the relationship between a given percentile in 1963 and wage growth over
the subsequent 40 years is almost linear, except at the very low end of the distribution. This
implies that wage inequality has increased by a fanning out of the entire distribution, leaving
the relative ranking of each percentile largely unchanged over time.
The model counterpart is also plotted in ﬁgure 8 (thick solid line). It shows the same
general pattern of widening inequality that is spread quite evenly across the wage distribution
as observed in the data. Therefore, despite the fact that the model displays signiﬁcant
nonlinearities in the relative wages in the short run, it displays an almost perfect linearity—
that is, a stretching out of the entire wage distribution—in the long run. The mechanism
behind this result should be clear from earlier discussions. Wage inequality arises entirely
from diﬀerences in human capital accumulation rates, which in turn arises from diﬀerences in
ability (for a given age). Because individuals’ investment response to SBTC is monotonically
increasing in their ability, those with high ability have both higher wages in 1963 and a
higher wage growth in the subsequent 40 years; see ﬁgure 12 below. The existence of this
same pattern in the data suggests that this mechanism appears to be an important channel
behind the rise in within-group inequality.
27Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) also ﬁnd the same pattern when they examine the wage distribution
for each education group and each age group, making this point even stronger. We have generated the
corresponding graphs from our model, and they are also qualitatively consistent with the data. For brevity’s
sake, we do not discuss them here; however, they are available upon request.
31Figure 8: Log Real Wage Changes by Percentile: Model versus US Data, 1963–2003
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4.2 Evolution of Average Wages
Stagnation of Median Wages and the Productivity Slowdown. We now turn from
the second moments of the wage distribution to the ﬁrst moment, that is, the changes in the
average wages over this period. Macroeconomists and labor economists have documented
two closely related trends: the slowdown in labor productivity and the stagnation of median
wage growth from early 1970s until the mid-1990s.
Figure 9 plots the growth rate of the median wage in the U.S. data and in the model.
(The circles correspond to actual U.S. data points, whereas the line marked with squares
plots the decade averages to eliminate the short-term ﬂuctuations in the data.) In the US
data, median wage growth falls sharply in 1973 and continues to stagnate for several decades:
in particular, the median wage grows at 2.6 percent per year in the 1960s, but only by 0.49
percent in the 1970s, and averages close to zero percent until 1995. Median wage growth
picks up after 1995 and averages 2.1 percent until the end of the decade. In the model,
median wage growth falls sharply in 1970 (immediately after the start of SBTC), and also
recovers in a very sluggish manner as in the data: the median wage grows at 0.46 percent
per year in the 1970s, and averages 0.81 percent overall until 1995, representing a signiﬁcant
slowdown compared to the 1.5 percent growth during the period before 1970. Thus, while the
model does not fully capture the magnitude of the slowdown in median wage growth, it does
generate a signiﬁcant slowdown starting in early the 1970s that persists for several decades.
Similarly, ﬁgure 10 plots labor productivity growth in the model and in the U.S. data, which
reveals a similar picture.28 Finally, as can be seen in both ﬁgures, imperfect foresight has a
28More precisely, in the US data, productivity growth averages 2.47 percent from 1951 to 1969, but falls
32Figure 9: Growth Rate of Median Wages: Model versus the U.S. Data, 1965-2000































0 Model (Unbiased Priors)
BL
−− Model (Pessimistic Priors)
U.S. (raw) data 
U.S. data (decade averages)
minor eﬀect on the evolution of median wage growth as well as labor productivity.
Three reasons account for the prolonged stagnation in wage growth in the model. First,
as noted earlier, workers respond to SBTC by increasing their on-the-job investment, which
reduces average wages. The fraction of time invested before SBTC is 7.2 percent (or 2.9 hours
in a 40-hour workweek) and increases to reach 12.9 percent in 1995 (or 5.1 hours a week).
Neither the initial investment level nor the increase during SBTC appears implausibly large,
especially considering that what matters for average wages is the change in (1   i); which
goes from 93 percent down to 87 percent over 26 years. One reason for the relatively small
change is that, as discussed above, the investment response is concentrated among young
individuals, keeping the change in the population average of investment small. Another
reason is that on-the-job investment is bounded from above by  = 0:50, limiting how much
it can rise even for young individuals. Second, as mentioned earlier, SBTC also lengthens
the duration of college education for those already planning to go to college. Consequently,
the average ability of individuals who remain in the labor market continually falls during
SBTC. Because individuals with lower ability also have low human capital on average, this
“selection eﬀect” also depresses average wages and labor productivity after SBTC. Third, and
ﬁnally, there is a pure price eﬀect resulting from SBTC. Essentially, because the price of raw
labor is falling as the price of human capital is rising, and because the baseline calibration
implies that the stock of raw labor is larger than the stock of human capital before SBTC,
the change in relative prices puts further downward pressure on the average wage.
to 1.73 percent in the 1970s, and averages 1.65 percent until 1995. Similarly, in the model, productivity
growth falls sharply in 1970 and grows by only 0.6 percent per year during the 1970s, but recovers faster and
averages 1.24 percent per year until 1995. In the model, labor productivity simply equals the mean wage
rate, since there is no capital. The empirical measure of productivity used in this section is calculated (by
the authors) from the non-farm output per hour series obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS).
33Figure 10: Labor Productivity Growth: Model versus U.S. Data, 1965-2000
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To sum up, during this period the labor market is composed of individuals who invest
more on the job, but who also have lower ability than before, resulting in slow wage and
productivity growth. Over time, the increase in the total human capital stock due to both
types of investment begins to dominate, resulting in a recovery in both the median wage and
labor productivity.
4.3 Evolution of Lifetime Wage (Consumption) Inequality
A rather surprising empirical ﬁnding from this period is that the rise in consumption in-
equality has been muted compared to the rise in wage inequality. Figure 11 (line with
triangles) plots the variance of log consumption for several years between 1972 and 2000,
calculated using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which shows a very small rise of about
2 log points over this period (data taken directly from Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2005)). Although there remains some disagreement about the exact magnitude of the rise in
consumption inequality (mainly due to data problems), other studies have also documented
ﬁndings broadly supporting this conclusion (cf., Krueger and Perri (2006) and Attanasio,
Battistin, and Ichimura (2004)). Moreover, the change between the 90th and 50th per-
centiles of the consumption distribution has not tracked the large rise in the 90–50 percentile
wage inequality. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2004) document this fact and call it puzzling.
The present model abstracts from many features that would be important for a detailed
analysis of consumption inequality (such as incomplete markets, retirement savings, demo-
graphic changes, etc.). But the model can still address a closely related but key question:
Has the substantial rise in cross-sectional wage inequality during this period resulted in a
parallel rise in lifetime income inequality? The line marked with squares in ﬁgure 11 plots
the evolution of lifetime income inequality in the model, which shows a very small increase
34Figure 11: The Evolution of Wage and Consumption Inequality: Model versus U.S. Data,
1965–2000.
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of 0.2 log points during SBTC. Since individuals consume a ﬁxed fraction of their lifetime
income in the present model, this is also the rise in consumption inequality.29 (The ﬁgure
also reproduces the graphs of wage inequality from ﬁgure 3 for comparison.)
At ﬁrst blush, it seems surprising that wage inequality could rise in such a systematic
fashion without a signiﬁcant change in lifetime incomes. But note that, as mentioned earlier,
wage inequality rises in this model because of a fanning out of wage proﬁles. This can be
clearly seen in ﬁgure 12, which plots the life cycle wage proﬁles in the steady state before
SBTC (left panel) and after SBTC (right panel).30 As can be seen in these ﬁgures, those
individuals who experience a large increase in their wages later in life are exactly those who
make larger investments and accept lower wages early on in response to SBTC. Because
future gains are discounted compared to the early losses in calculating lifetime income, the
rise in lifetime inequality remains small.
29We sidestep a small complication in this discussion, but we fully account for it in the calculations. In
particular, the statement in the text that consumption equals the annuitized value of lifetime income is
correct when individuals experience no shocks during their lifetime, since they begin with zero ﬁnancial
wealth. However, for those individuals who are in existence in 1970, consumption after that date is not
simply equal to the annuity value of their remaining lifetime income, but also takes into account the fact
that they over-saved or under-saved before the shock, given the new path of prices and the implied lifetime
wages. Therefore, the inequality in consumption calculated this way goes up more than it would have had
we only looked at lifetime income inequality calculated at birth.
30Haider (2001) estimates an econometric process for wages using micro data from 1968 to 1993 allowing
for heterogeneity in growth rates. He ﬁnds that the rise in wage inequality during this period happened as
an increase in the dispersion of wage growth rates, consistent with this ﬁgure.
35Figure 12: Large Rise in Cross-Sectional Wage Inequality: Small Rise in Lifetime Wage
Inequality
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To sum up, the present model oﬀers a new mechanism that is consistent with a large
increase in wage inequality but a small change in lifetime inequality. A fuller investigation
of this model for consumption facts is left for future work.
4.4 The Rise in the Relative Supply of College Labor
While the main focus of this paper is on the evolution of the wage distribution, the model
also makes predictions about the behavior of college enrollment, and consequently, about the
change in the relative supply of college-educated labor during this period. Figure 13 plots
(line with squares) the total hours worked by individuals with a college-equivalent degree
or more relative to those with lower educational levels. This measure more than doubles
from 1970 to 2000 in the U.S. data. The model counterpart (thick solid line) understates the
level of relative supply before SBTC, which is perhaps not surprising, since no attempt was
made to match any aspect of educational attainment in the calibration. However, the relative
supply grows signiﬁcantly in the model, by 0.36 over the entire period, compared to 0.33 in the
data. This similarity seems surprising given that in the model college education is modeled
merely as a by-product—depending on whether investment exceeds a certain threshold or
not—and many potentially important features have been left out, such as tuition costs,
changes in the availability of ﬁnancial aid for college, changes in the quality of education,
and so on. This result suggests that SBTC might have played a more important role than
these factors in determining the overall rise in educational attainment during this period.31
31A related observation during this period has been made by Katz and Murphy (1992, p. 52): “[F]or the
1963-87 period as a whole and most strongly for the 1980s, the groups with the largest increases in relative
36Figure 13: The Relative Supply of College Equivalent Labor: Model versus U.S. data, 1965–
2000






























































However, despite these plausible implications for the long-run behavior, the model does
not capture the behavior of college enrollment rates in the short run. In particular, college
enrollment rates were stagnant in the U.S. data in the 1970s (cf., Card and Lemieux (2001)),
whereas the model predicts an immediate rise after the onset of SBTC. As we show in
Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007), this counterfactual implication is a direct consequence of
the assumption we make in this paper that SBTC happens in a completely disembodied
fashion: that is, the productivity of all human capital rises at the same rate (given by H)
regardless of when it is acquired. Consequently, immediately after the beginning of SBTC,
individuals realize that they can gain immensely by investing today and capitalizing on all
future improvements in technology, which causes enrollment rates to rise in the short run.
In that paper, we also theoretically show that if part of SBTC comes embodied in new
vintages of human capital, under certain parameter conditions college enrollment falls in the
short run but rises in the long run. This is because, unlike with disembodied SBTC, now
individuals do not gain from future improvements in technology by investing in the current
vintage of human capital, which makes it optimal to spread investment more evenly over the
life cycle. Therefore, investment early in life (i.e., college enrollment) falls, whereas on-the-
supplies tended to have the largest increases in relative wages.” This observation is diﬃcult to reconcile with
a model where both the demand and supply are driven by exogenous factors. While one explanation for this
fact has been provided by Acemoglu’s (1998) model where demand endogenously responds to changes in the
supply of diﬀerent types of labor, the present model is also consistent with this observation, since now both
the supply of diﬀerent types of workers and their wages (due to diﬀerential human capital accumulation)
respond endogenously to changes in demand.
37job investment rises. Because of the latter (and in particular, because on-the-job investment
rises in both the short run and the long run) the present model’s plausible implications for
the short-run behavior of college premium and average wages are preserved. See Guvenen
and Kuruscu (2007) for further details and proofs of these results. Although introducing
disembodied SBTC would be a very valuable addition for a more detailed study of the
trends in educational attainment, such an extension introduces several layers of complexity,
which would distract from the main focus of this paper on the evolution of wages. We leave
such an extension for future work.32
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied a parsimonious overlapping-generations model of human cap-
ital accumulation with some key ingredients: (i) signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the ability to
learn new skills, (ii) raw labor as a factor of production in addition to human capital, (iii)
an aggregate production function that takes these two factors—rather than workers with
diﬀerent education levels—as inputs, and (iv) SBTC, modeled as a rise in the relative price
of human capital. We have found that the resulting model makes considerable progress to-
ward understanding seemingly disparate trends in the evolution of the wage distribution in
a unifying framework.
The model has some other implications for the behavior of wages that for brevity’s sake
have not been discussed in the paper. For example, the model is consistent with the ﬂat-
tening of, and the downward shift in, average life cycle wage proﬁles for subsequent cohorts,
documented by Kambourov and Manovskii (2005) from the 1970s to 1990s. Moreover, the
model implies that the bulk of the rise in cross-sectional wage inequality happens at the
top of the distribution: the rise in the 90–50 percentile wage diﬀerential is more than twice
the rise in the 50–10 percentile diﬀerential, consistent with the ﬁnding in Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2005b). (Results available upon request). However, the model does not explain
why college enrollment was stagnant in the 1970s, which suggests that this model, in its
current form, may not be suitable for a detailed study of the educational trends; attempting
that as well, however, may be too ambitious a goal for this paper. In Guvenen and Kuruscu
(2007), we sketch an extension of the present framework where skill-biased technical changes
come embodied in new vintages of human capital, which shows promise in that direction.
In contrast to the trend observed in the United States, wage inequality has increased
very little in continental European countries (CEU) since the 1970s and, in fact, has fallen
32There are also other reasons why college enrollment can respond diﬀerently to major changes in technol-
ogy than on-the-job investment. For example, as Becker (1964, p. 51) observes: “Training in new industrial
skill is usually ﬁrst given on the job since ﬁrms tend to be the ﬁrst to be aware of its value, but as demand
develops, some of the training shifts to schools.” This is likely to be especially true in the 1970s when many
new technologies were developed and used in a decentralized fashion across diﬀerent ﬁrms. It would take
time for a systematic body of knowledge to be distilled from the use of these technologies, which can then
be taught at formal education institutions. Therefore, one could expect the initial response to SBTC to take
place in the form of on-the-job training with a delayed rise in college enrollment.
38in some countries (e.g., France and Spain). At ﬁrst blush, this observation seems to pose
a challenge for the framework developed in this paper, to the extent that one views SBTC
as a global phenomenon. In Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009) we show that the key
to understanding these diﬀerent trends is to take into account the diﬀerences in the labor
income tax systems between the US and the CEU. In particular, the more progressive tax
structures of continental European countries distort the human capital investment decision
and mute the response to SBTC, resulting in a small rise in wage inequality over time. We
ﬁnd that a calibrated version of such a model can explain 2/3 of the diﬀerences in wage
inequality between the US and CEU in 2003, as well as 60% of the diﬀerential rise in wage
inequality from 1980 to 2005.
Finally, a contribution of this paper that could be of independent interest is the in-
troduction of raw labor, which allows us to think about returns-to-skill in the Ben-Porath
framework. The particular speciﬁcations for the human capital accumulation function and
aggregate production function also make the model quite tractable, and thus suitable for
potential extensions.
6 Appendix: Details of Bayesian Learning
6.1 Priors and the Evolution of Beliefs
This section provides the explicit formulas for the Bayesian learning model described in Section 2.3.
Individuals who enter the economy at t0 > 0 observe an initial private signal n
t0 = t0 + n
t0;








;t0 is the precision of existing individuals at time t0: This structure ensures that individuals




as individuals already in existence in that year.












where we used the normalization H;t + L;t = 1 made above. Since individuals know the values of
all variables except H;t, each wage realization reveals the price of human capital (and, consequently,
raw labor) in that period. Two consecutive realizations of an individual’s wage can then be used to
identify  + "t+1 (= H;t+1   H;t). Given individual n’s optimal forecast b n
t 1 at time t   1 and













(H;t   H;t 1); (15)
with precision (v + t)=2
":
39Table 3: Estimating the Katz-Murphy (1992) Regression Using Simulated Data
 = 1 log!
t = a0 + a1t   (1=)log(Nc;t=Nn;t) + error







(1) Baseline 2:47 0:88  0:87 0:025
(2)  = 0:75 2:49 0:84  0:82 0:029
(3) Nc=Nn = 0:36 2:79 0:85  0:86 0:023
Notes: T=30. The statistics are the medians of 100 simulations.
7 Appendix: Estimating the Implied Katz-Murphy Elas-
ticity
There are no existing estimates in the literature of  that would guide our calibration. One diﬃculty
with directly estimating  from data is that our production function (4) features such inputs as
human capital and investment time that are very diﬃcult to measure directly in the data. There
is, however, a large literature that has estimated a diﬀerent elasticity, one that measures the degree
of substitutability in a CES production function that takes the labor supplied by college and non-
college workers as inputs (cf., Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (2002)). This elasticity, denoted
as ; is obtained by running the following regression:
log!
t = a0 + a1t  
1

log(Nc;t=Nn;t) + error; (16)
where Nc=Nn is the labor supply of college-educated workers relative to non-college workers, using
the notation developed above. Notice that all the variables that appear in this regression can
be generated from our model as well. Therefore, an interesting question is the following: what
value would we recover for the Katz-Murphy elasticity, b , if we estimate equation (16) using data
simulated from our model?
Table 3 reports the results. To obtain these estimates, we solved the stochastic version of the
model but abstract from SBTC and, consequently, also from heterogeneity in beliefs (that is, we set
 = 0 throughout in equation (6), and   0). Then, we simulated data for 30 years and estimated
the regression in (16), repeating the exercise 100 times. The reported statistics are the median
values from these estimations.
In the ﬁrst row, the estimated elasticity is 2:47 and the regression has an R2 of 0:88. The
correlation of the college premium and the relative supply is also negative and very large. For
comparison, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a) obtain b  = 2:05 with an R2 of 0:94, in the closest
speciﬁcation to ours (see column 3 of table 2 in their paper). Similarly, Hamermesh (1993) surveys
the empirical estimates of b  that exist in the literature, which also concentrate around this value.
In the second row, we relax the upper bound on on-the-job investment ( = 0:75), which may
potentially alter the sensitivity of the college premium to the relative supply of college graduates.
This change makes little diﬀerence to the results. Finally, in the last row, the average relative
supply is calibrated to twice its average value in row 1, which increases b  somewhat, to 2.79.
40Overall, however, these changes have little eﬀect on the estimates of b .
To sum up, the choice of  = 1; which implies perfect substitution between H and L in our
model (in other words, an inﬁnite substitution elasticity!), generates not only a ﬁnite elasticity
between college and non-college workers, but also a relatively small value similar to that observed
in the data.
To understand this result, consider the response of this economy to a positive innovation, " > 0:
From equation (6), this shock results in a permanent increase in H=L; and therefore, in a rise
in human capital investment. At the extensive margin, this increases the relative supply of college
educated workers, starting the year after the shock. At the intensive margin, on-the-job training
rises diﬀerentially for high- and low-ability individuals, which causes the college premium to fall.
Therefore, following a positive " shock, the supply of college workers rises while, at the same time,
the college premium falls. This negative correlation makes it appear as if the high supply of college
workers reduces the college premium, as would be the case in a CES production function. In other
words, the disturbance term in the regression above is positively correlated with the relative supply
of college workers, which when ignored biases the estimated coeﬃcient (1=) upward (and the
estimated elasticity  downward). As a result, our model with  = 1 generates a ﬁnite substitution
elasticity in the regression above. Instead, if in the model the supply of college labor were to
change for completely exogenous reasons (and the workers to be added were selected randomly from
among each group), then the estimate of (1=) would be zero, correctly revealing the inﬁnite supply
elasticity. We conclude that if skill prices ﬂuctuate in a persistent manner, the estimate of  from
the regression in (16) is likely to be downward biased due to an omitted variable bias. The true
elasticity may be much higher—in the example presented, it is inﬁnite.
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